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Part II: 
 
Trade Strategies of the TPP-11 Countries: 
Asian Regionalism in Turbulent Times 
Pasha L. HSIEH 
 
ABSTRACT 
The US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Pacific Partnership (TPP) in January 2017 has 
prompted the remaining countries to pursue alternative trade strategies. Australia and 
Japan have pushed for effectuating the TPP without US participation. The current 
efforts focus on seeking consensus on the scope of suspensions over the original 
agreement. The TPP-11 countries expect to reach an agreement in principle during the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in November 2017. Critical factors that will 
influence the TPP also include negotiations for the 16-country Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership and China’s new trade initiatives. Hence, EU 
policy on trade and investment agreements with the Asia-Pacific ought to consider the 
changing dynamics of Asian regionalism. 
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List of selected trade initiatives 
Abbreviation  Title Nature Member 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
 
Annul forum/Economic 
cooperation 
21 Asia-Pacific 
economies  
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations 
Economic community 10 Southeast Asian 
countries 
CETA Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement 
Comprehensive FTA Canada and the EU 
FTAAP Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific Comprehensive FTA 21 APEC economies 
NAFTA North American Free Trade 
Agreement 
Comprehensive FTA Canada, Mexico, and 
the US 
OBOR One Belt, One Road initiative China-led economic 
cooperation 
69 economies 
RCEP Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership 
Comprehensive FTA 16 Asia-Pacific 
countries 
TiSA Trade in Services Agreement WTO plurilateral 
agreement on services 
23 parties (including 
the EU) 
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership Comprehensive FTA 11 countries (after the 
US withdrawal) 
 
1 Introduction 
This paper forms part of the study for the workshop of the Trade Committee of the European Parliament 
on “New options for trade relations in the Pacific and their potential effects on the EU and global 
trade policies.” In particular, the paper focuses on the trade strategies of Asia-Pacific and Latin American 
countries that are parties to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) after the US withdrew from the agreement. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the current status of the TPP. It assesses the legal and 
political issues associated with the positions and options of the remaining 11 partners. Section 3 sheds 
light on the evolution of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a 16-country mega-
regional trade agreement that has been perceived to be the alternative to the TPP. Section 4 analyses the 
role of China in the new dynamics of Asia-Pacific regionalism in light of China’s economic policy and free 
trade agreement (FTA) development.  
Section 5 explores the impact of the TPP and the RCEP on the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). 
This Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)-based initiative is poised to include 21 economies. Finally, 
Section 6 provides an overview of the EU trade and investment agreements with TPP and RCEP countries 
and offers policy recommendations for EU trade strategies toward the Asia-Pacific. 
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2 The current status of the TPP 
The TPP was built on the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (known as the P-4 agreement) 
between Brunei, Chile, Singapore and New Zealand. The Obama administration’s decision to join the TPP 
negotiations in 2009 reinforced its “pivot to Asia” strategy.42 12 TPP partners commenced negotiations in 
2010 and signed the agreement in 2016.43 The TPP is often claimed to be a 21st century trade agreement 
that sets the gold standard. Against this background, the European Parliament’s study on the TPP provides 
comprehensive research on the TPP’s key elements and the EU’s engagement in the Asia-Pacific.44 
In January 2017, the Trump administration informed the TPP partners of the US withdrawal from the TPP. 
It became uncertain whether the remaining signatories (TPP-11 countries) would continue their 
commitments and bring the TPP into effect. The TPP-11 countries convened in Chile in March 2017. 
According to the joint statement issued from the city of Viña del Mar, Chile, the representatives discussed 
the TPP-related domestic processes “and canvassed views on a way forward that would advance economic 
integration in the Asia Pacific.”45 They also “reiterated their firm commitment to collaborate in keeping 
markets open.”46  
In May 2017, the 11 partners met again in Vietnam. According to the Ministerial Statement, they “reaffirmed 
the balanced outcome and the strategic and economic significance of the TPP” and “agreed to launch a 
process to assess options to bring” the TPP into force.47 The assessment is expected to be finalized at the 
APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Vietnam in November 2017. To undertake the ministerial mandate, 
senior officials met in Sydney in August and Tokyo in September 2017.48 
Australia and Japan have been the driving forces behind the push to continue with the TPP even without 
US participation. Mexico, New Zealand and Singapore clearly indicated their support for this position.49 
However, given the following challenges, keeping the status quo of the TPP may not be feasible. First, 
certain TPP partners, exemplified by Vietnam, have expressed reluctance to maintain the same 
commitments without access to the US market.50 The TPP-11 countries agreed to suspend selected rules 
in the TPP and the Tokyo meeting aimed to discuss the 50 proposed items for suspension.51 As of 
September 2017, the countries only agreed to freeze extended protection periods for patent and data on 
biomedicines, which the US insisted. Other controversial issues relate to clauses on state-owned-
 
42 I. Fergusson, & B. Williams, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Key Provisions and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research 
Service, 2016, p. 1-6, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44489.pdf. 
43 The full text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement can be found at 
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/news/Pages/news.aspx (last visited 28 Sept. 2017) (TPP News). 
44 P. Chase, et. al., The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Implications for the EU Economy and for its Trade Negotiations with the 
United States, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department, 
April 2017. 
45 TPP News, op. cit. 
46 TPP News, op. cit. 
47 TPP News, op. cit. 
48 TPP News, op. cit.; TPP Members Make Progress on New Trade Accord, Eye November Deadline, Japan Times, September 2017, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/09/22/business/tpp-members-make-progress-new-trade-accord-eye-november-
deadline/#.WcxLyluCx0w. 
49 K. Binder, From TPP to New Trade Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific Region, European Parliamentary Research Service, 2017, p. 3, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2017)603953; Mexican Minister Supports 
Japan’s Leadership in Achieving TPP without U.S., Japan Times, July 2017, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/07/31/business/mexican-minister-supports-japans-leadership-achieving-tpp-without-
u-s/#.Wadwy7IjF0w. 
50 Vietnam Proposes Amendments to Stalled TPP Trade Deal at Sydney Talks: Sources, Reuters, August 2017, 
http://bilaterals.org/?vietnam-proposes-amendments-to&lang=en.  
51 R. Yasoshima & J. Yamazaki, Japan Pushes for ‘TPP 11’ Progress with Tokyo Meeting, Nikkei Asian Review, September 2017, 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Japan-pushes-for-TPP-11-progress-with-Tokyo-meeting. 
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enterprises and labour rights protection. At the APEC meeting, the TPP-11 countries expect to conclude 
the agreement in principle that will determine the scope of suspensions over the original agreement.52  
Second, to date, only Japan and New Zealand have ratified the TPP (in January and May 2017, 
respectively).53 To implement the TPP, the current ratification clause needs to be amended. Under Article 
30.5, the TPP coming into force is conditioned on the approval of six members that account for 85% of the 
combined gross domestic product (GDP) “of the original signatories.” This provision makes US membership 
indispensable, as the US GDP alone accounts for 62.5% of the combined GDP of the original 12 TPP 
countries.54 Lastly, ongoing FTA negotiations may influence the momentum for expediting TPP talks. 
Notable examples include the RCEP, the EU-Japan FTA, the China–Japan-Korea FTA, and Australia’s FTAs 
with India and Indonesia. 
Recent elections and policy changes in selected TPP countries are also of significance to the pact. As Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe’s ruling coalition won a two-thirds majority in Parliament in the October 2017 election, 
Japan will strengthen its leadership in implementing the TPP. Another TPP meeting, which will be 
convened near Tokyo one week before the APEC summit in November, will further narrow the scope of 
proposed amendments and suspensions to the agreement.55  
On par with Australia and Japan, New Zealand’s position has been to keep the TPP intact. However, 
following the election in September 2017, new Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern indicated that her centre-
left government will renegotiate the TPP terms that affect foreign ownership of residential property.56 In 
this regard, New Zealand will be more in line with Canada and Malaysia. They consider the TPP to be the 
strategic option to bridge ties with emerging economies but argue for selected terms to be renegotiated.57  
3 RCEP negotiations: an ASEAN initiative 
The 16 RCEP countries account for 32% of world goods exports and 28% of global GDP.58 Built upon the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) FTAs, the RCEP includes ten ASEAN countries and ASEAN’s 
six FTA partners. The RCEP has been perceived as the agreement best positioned to compete with the TPP 
because seven countries are parties to both mega-regional trade pacts. Significantly, China and India are 
parties to the RCEP but not to the TPP. The RCEP is also expected to fill the FTA gap between China and 
India and between China and Japan.  
 
52 M. Smith, Japanese eager for Trans-Pacific Partnership with All eyes, including Theirs, on NAFTA, National Post, October 2017, 
http://nationalpost.com/news/politics/japanese-keen-to-move-on-trans-pacific-partnership-with-all-eyes-including-theirs-on-
nafta.  
53 K. Buchanan, New Zealand: Ratification of Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Completed, Library of Congress Global Legal 
Monitor, May 2017, http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/new-zealand-ratification-of-trans-pacific-partnership-
agreement-completed/. 
54 M. Tsirbas et. al., ‘The Future of the TPP’, ASEAN Focus No. 8, October 2016, pp. 14-15. 
55 TPP Negotiators to Meet in Japan Next Week ahead of APEC Summit, Japan Times, October 2017, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/10/24/business/tpp-negotiators-meet-japan-next-week-ahead-apec-
summit/#.WfAqNluCx0w.  
56 B. Cooper, New Zealand’s Incoming Leader Flags TPP Problems, Reuters, October 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-
tpp-newzealand/new-zealands-incoming-leader-flags-tpp-problems-idUSKBN1CR042.  
57 M. Kappler, Canada, other countries will move forward on new Trans-Pacific Partnership after U.S. withdrawal, Toronto Sun, May 
2017, http://torontosun.com/2017/05/21/canada-other-countries-will-move-forward-on-new-trans-pacific-partnership-after-us-
withdrawal/wcm/e6754d14-69a2-446f-ac4a-8781fce8a918; Malaysia Eyes TPP-11, But on Its Terms, AEC News Today, October 2017, 
https://aecnewstoday.com/2017/malaysia-eyes-tpp-11-but-on-its-terms/#axzz4wV6tEGum.  
58 A. Staples, ASEAN Connections: How Mega-regional Trade and Investment Initiatives in Asia Will Shape Business Strategy in ASEAN 
and Beyond, Economist Corporate Network Report, April 2016, p. 12, http://economists-pick-
research.hktdc.com/resources/MI_Portal/Article/ef/2016/12/477594/1482890146457_Baker-ASEAN-Connections-Report.pdf. 
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As for substantive commitments, the RCEP aims to achieve a “comprehensive, high quality” FTA, although 
the level of the RCEP’s liberalization is envisioned to be lower than that of the TPP and EU FTAs.59 In addition 
to core elements, such as trade in goods, trade in services and investment, the RCEP will incorporate 
chapters on competition, intellectual property and other issues. To date, the negotiators have finalized the 
chapters on “economic and technical cooperation” and on “small and medium enterprises.”60 Working 
groups on government procurement and trade remedies also convened for the first time in July 2017.61 
However, it is unknown whether the RCEP countries are contemplating the inclusion of regulatory issues 
on environmental standards or the protection of labour rights. 
The RCEP can trace back to various initiatives of Asian regionalism. In the 2000s, China and Japan supported 
different regional initiatives, known as the East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and the Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA).62 The EAFTA is based on the ASEAN+3 structure, whereas the 
CEPEA is based on the ASEAN+6 framework that includes Australia, India and New Zealand. During the 
same period, APEC’s FTAAP proposal and US accession to the TPP made the roadmap for Asian regionalism 
more complex. In 2011, ASEAN states introduced the framework for the RCEP to integrate FTA partners and 
to ensure ASEAN centrality.63 
Based on ASEAN’s 2012 Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the RCEP, the 16-party 
negotiations since 2013 have essentially merged China’s and Japan’s proposals.64 In September 2017, RCEP 
partners agreed on “the RCEP Key Elements for Significant Outcomes by End of 2017” and mandated that 
officials report the outcomes to leaders in November 2017.65 The chair of the 19th RCEP trade negotiations 
committee indicated that the agreement “could be concluded sometime in 2018.”66 
The fact that ASEAN has driven the RCEP process is different from the conventional understanding that 
China has dominated the negotiations.67 From legal and political aspects, building the RCEP on ASEAN’s 
internal and external FTAs is a more feasible option. The ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 
places the RCEP as ASEAN’s trade priority.68 ASEAN has concluded five ASEAN+1 FTAs with six Asia-Pacific 
partners since 2002 and the RCEP could further streamline the regional supply chain. It should be noted 
that the differences in legal structures and commitments among ASEAN+1 FTAs could influence the RCEP.  
Among ASEAN+1 FTAs, the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA is the only comprehensive, single-
undertaking FTA. ASEAN FTAs with China, India, Japan and Korea have followed the incremental approach 
by first enacting a framework agreement that facilitates the signing of subsequent agreements on trade in 
 
59 Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, 2012, 
http://asean.org/storage/2012/05/RCEP-Guiding-Principles-public-copy.pdf (Guiding Principles). 
60 ASEAN, Joint Media Statement, the Third Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Intersessional Ministerial 
Meeting, May 2017, p. 1, http://asean.org/storage/2017/05/RCEP-3ISSL-MM-JMS-FINAL-22052017.pdf.  
61 ASEAN, Joint Media Statement, the Fifth Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Ministerial Meeting, 2017, p. 1, 
http://asean.org/storage/2017/09/RCEP-5MM-Final-JMS1.pdf (RCEP Statement 2017). 
62 C. Kent, ‘East Asian Integration Towards an East Asian Economic Community’, ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 665, February 2017, 
p. 23, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/228896/adbi-wp665.pdf; East Asia Vision Group II (EAVGII), Summary of 
Stock-Taking Report on ASEAN Plus Three Economic and Financial Cooperation, Report of the East Asian Vision Group II (EAVG), 2013, 
p. 43-46, http://www.mfa.go.th/asean/contents/files/asean-media-center-20130312-112418-758604.pdf.   
63 ASEAN Framework for Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, 2011, http://asean.org/?static_post=asean-framework-
for-regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership. 
64 Guiding Principles, op. cit. 
65 RCEP Statement 2017, op. cit. 
66 RCEP Trade Panel Head Confident of Closing Talks in 2018, Times of India, July 2017, 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/rcep-trade-panel-head-confident-of-closing-talks-in-
2018/articleshow/59756548.cms. 
67 Pambagyo, I., ‘RCEP is the Only Game in Town’, ASEAN Focus No. 2, March 2017, pp. 26-27. 
68 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025, 2015, p. 35-36, http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/aec-
page/AEC-Blueprint-2025-FINAL.pdf.   
What next after the US withdrawal from the TPP? 
What are the options for trade relations in the Pacific and what will be the impact on the EU? 
25 
goods, services, investment and dispute settlement. All agreements form the integrity of FTAs. The ASEAN-
Japan FTA remains incomplete because it encompasses merely the agreement on goods. 
There are salient features of the RCEP. As negotiating countries accepted India’s request for adopting the 
single-undertaking approach, the RCEP will likely follow the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA’s “all in” 
formula. According to the Guiding Principles, the RCEP will not extinguish intra-RCEP FTAs and “no 
provision in the RCEP agreement will detract from the terms and conditions in” existing FTAs.69 In other 
words, the RCEP will co-exist with the five ASEAN+1 FTAs. Moreover, to accommodate “the different levels 
of development,” the RCEP will allow for flexibility by incorporating special and differential treatment 
provisions.70 This flexibility design is consistent with arrangements for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and 
Vietnam under ASEAN and ASEAN+1 FTA frameworks.  
4 The China dimension 
China was initially skeptical about the TPP, but changed its position when the Ministry of Commerce 
Ministry announced a “serious study” of the TPP in May 2013.71 President Xi Jinping reinforced this position 
at the Sunnylands summit.72 In the meantime, China’s wait-and-see position on the TPP is exemplified by 
its acceleration of the RCEP and bilateral FTAs, as well as its experiment with higher-level liberalization in 
the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone. China’s positions on the TPP and the RCEP inevitably affect the 
feasibility of pathways to the FTAAP. 
Markedly, China has concluded bilateral FTAs with five TPP countries (Australia, Chile, New Zealand, Peru 
and Singapore), and is negotiating to upgrade FTAs with Chile, New Zealand and Singapore.73 As for the 
RCEP, China is the largest member economy, which accounts for more than one third of RCEP GDP.74 Four 
of China’s FTAs also cover 13 RCEP countries.75 According to an empirical study, the Chinese economy 
could gain $88 billion if the TPP failed and the RCEP were passed, and this amount is $16 billion more than 
the scenario where both mega-regionals became effective.76 The political likelihood of concluding the 
RCEP and implementing the TPP (among the 11 parties) in 2018 remains optimistic. 
The RCEP could benefit China’s 13th Five-Year Plan, in which the National People’s Congress first placed 
the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative as a national priority in 2016.77 The OBOR initiative is based on 
President Xi’s announcement of “the Silk Road Economic Belt” and “the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road” 
 
69 Guiding Principles, op. cit., principles 2 & 5. 
70 Guiding Principles, op. cit., principle 4. 
71 Y. Min, China Liked TPP — Until U.S. Officials Opened Their Mouths, Foreign Policy, May 2015, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/15/china-liked-trans-pacific-partnership-until-u-s-officials-opened-their-mouths-trade-
agreement-rhetoric-fail/. 
72 B. Gordon, Bring China Into TPP, The National Interest, April 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/bring-china-tpp-
10227. 
73 China FTA Network, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/ (last visited 29 Sept. 2017). 
74 China’s share of RCEP GDP, see P. Hubbard & D. Sharma, ‘Understanding and Applying Long-term GDP Projections’, EABER 
Working Paper Series No. 18, June 2016, p. 15, 
http://saber.eaber.org/system/tdf/documents/EABER%20Working%20Paper%20119%20Hubbard%20Sharma.pdf?file=1&type=
node&id=25601&force=; J. Jin, RCEP v. TPP, Fujitsu Research Institute, February 2013, 
http://www.fujitsu.com/jp/group/fri/en/column/message/2013/2013-02-22.html. 
75 These agreements are China’s FTAs with ASEAN, Australia, Korea and Singapore. 
76 United States Government Publishing Office, 2016 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, 2016, p. 24, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/Executive%20Summary%202016.pdf. 
77 See generally K. Koleski, The 13th Five-Year Plan, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 2017, p. 3 & 20-
22, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/The%2013th%20Five-Year%20Plan.pdf. 
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in Kazakhstan and Indonesia, respectively, in 2013.78 The goal of OBOR is to export China’s excess industrial 
capacity and capital.  
OBOR also became a guiding principle of China’s 2015 FTA strategy, which accelerates the building of high-
level free trade areas and strengthens economic cooperation.79 An OBOR summit was held in Beijing in 
May 2017 and currently OBOR includes 69 economies.80 Important TPP and RCEP countries that are not 
OBOR members include Australia, India and Japan. In 2017, Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe 
announced the creation of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, which resembles OBOR by focusing on 
infrastructure projects and capacity building.81 The dynamics between China, India and Japan will influence 
the RCEP progress. 
5 The APEC-based FTAAP 
APEC includes TPP-11 countries and 12 parties to the RCEP. APEC’s Bogor Goals aim to achieve “free and 
open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific” by 2020.82 To reinvigorate APEC in light of proliferating FTAs, 
the APEC Business Advisory Council proposed the APEC-based FTAAP in 2004.83 After APEC agreed to 
examine the FTAAP in 2006, the 2010 APEC Leaders’ Declaration identified “ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership” as pathways to the 21-party FTA.84  
The economic rationale for the FTAAP can be interpreted as fortifying the link among APEC economies 
amid the Doha Round impasse. In reality, the enormous development gap between countries such as the 
US and Papua New Guinea makes the FTAAP infeasible in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the FTAAP 
could buttress APEC’s institutional role in facilitating regional trade initiatives. In the APEC context, the 
RCEP first appeared when APEC leaders declared that “the possible pathways to the FTAAP” include both 
the TPP and the RCEP in the Annex on the 2014 Beijing Roadmap.85 China pushed for the inclusion of the 
RCEP when it hosted the APEC meetings in 2014. The United States initially opposed the initiative because 
of concern about detracting from the TPP.86 The compromise was to pursue APEC’s Collective Strategic 
Study on the FTAAP under the auspices of China. In 2015, APEC leaders urged the early completion of RCEP 
negotiations.87  
In 2016, APEC further endorsed the FTAAP Study that details the convergences and divergences of Asia-
Pacific trade rules, as well as the status and features of the TPP, the RCEP and the Pacific Alliance.88 
 
78 L. Zhang, Chronology of China's Belt and Road Initiative, China.org.cn, January 2017, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2017-
01/05/content_40044651.htm. 
79 State Council, Several Opinions on Accelerating the Implementation of the Free Trade Area Strategy, 2015. 
80 Belt and Road Attendees List, The Diplomat, May 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/belt-and-road-attendees-list/; The Belt 
and Road Initiative: Country Profiles, HKTDC Research, http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/The-Belt-and-
Road-Initiative/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-Country-Profiles/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A36I0.htm (last visited 9 September 2017). 
81 Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development: A Vision Document, Economic Research 
Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), May 2017, p. 3-6, http://www.eria.org/Asia-Africa-Growth-Corridor-Document.pdf. 
82 1994 Leaders’ Declaration, Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), November 1994, https://www.apec.org/Meeting-
Papers/Leaders-Declarations/1994/1994_aelm.aspx. 
83 Asia Pacific Business Leaders to Press APEC Leaders to Accelerate Regional Economic Integration, APEC News Release, February 2014, 
p. 1, https://www.businessnz.org.nz/news-and-media/media-releases/2014/asia-pacific-business-leaders-to-press-apec-leaders-
to-accelerate-regional-economic-integration. 
84 Annex A to the 2014 Leaders Declaration: The Beijing Roadmap for APEC’s Contribution to the Realization of the FTAAP, 
https://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2014/2014_aelm/2014_aelm_annexa.aspx (Beijing Roadmap). 
85 Beijing Roadmap, op. cit. 
86 S. Tiezzi, US Pressures China to Kill Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement Talks, The Diplomat, November 2014, 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/us-pressures-china-to-kill-asia-pacific-free-trade-agreement-talks/. 
87 2015 Leaders’ Declaration, Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), November 2015, https://www.apec.org/Meeting-
Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2015/2015_aelm.aspx. 
88 2016 Leaders’ Declaration, Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), November 2016, https://www.apec.org/Meeting-
Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2016/2016_aelm.aspx; Appendix 6: Collective Strategic Study on Issues Related to the Realization of 
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Significantly, the open accession clauses of the TPP and the RCEP enable either agreement to lead to the 
FTAAP. Article 30.4 of the TPP provides that the accession to the TPP is open to “any State or separate 
customs territory,” which is an APEC member “as the Parties may agree.” Pursuant to the Guiding Principle, 
the RCEP will also allow “the participation of any ASEAN FTA partner” or “any other external economic 
partner.”89 
In terms of North and Latin America, three North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries have 
started negotiations to amend the NAFTA and Canada and Mexico have explored the feasibility of 
concluding FTAs with China.90 Canada, along with Australia, New Zealand and Singapore, also expect to 
join the 4-country Pacific Alliance as associate members.91 Two Pacific Alliance and TPP members, Chile 
and Peru, have indicated their interest in joining the RCEP.92  
Moreover, instead of joining the ASEAN-China FTA, Hong Kong has concluded negotiations for the ASEAN-
Hong Kong FTA and Investment Agreement and both instruments will be signed in November 2017.93 The 
new ASEAN+1 FTA will pave the way for Hong Kong to join the RCEP. As the FTAAP will include 21 Asia-
Pacific economies, the expansion of the TPP, the RCEP, or the Pacific Alliance will contribute to forming the 
APEC-based FTA. 
6 Conclusions and recommendations for the EU 
This paper provided an up-to-date overview of the TPP. While TPP-11 countries agreed to continue the 
agreement, the challenge will be to narrow and define the scope of suspensions over contentious 
provisions. The RCEP has been arguably “on track” and expects to be concluded in 2018. However, the 
flexibility and SDT mechanisms of the RCEP can compromise the intended result of liberalization. To 
implement its OBOR initiative, China’s membership in the RCEP and FTAs with TPP members have 
influenced the dynamics of both mega-regionals. The FTAAP will also be built upon the ratification of the 
TPP, the RCEP and, to a lesser extent, the Pacific Alliance. 
According to its new “Trade for All” trade strategy in 2015, the European Commission stressed its strategic 
interest in the Asia-Pacific. The EU-Vietnam FTA was concluded in 2015 and expects to enter into force in 
2018.94 Negotiations for the EU-Singapore FTA were completed in 2014 but the FTA has yet to be ratified, 
pending the implementation of the decision that the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court) 
rendered in May 2017.95 In the Court’s view, the EU-Singapore FTA is a mixed agreement under which the 
EU and its member states share competence to sign provisions on non-foreign direct investment and 
 
the FTAAP, 2016 CTI Report to Ministers, November 2016, p. 157-70, https://www.apec.org/~/media/Files/.../Appendix%2006%20-
%20FTAAP%20Study.pdf. 
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Canada for China, Global Times, July 2017, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1056253.shtml. 
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2017). 
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http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-09/09/content_31769119.htm. 
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https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0910b071-b602-461b-a393-92a9fa1295d1. 
95 European Commission, Trade: Countries and Regions – Singapore, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
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investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).96 Following the decision, Singapore indicated its wish to have the 
EU provisionally apply the sections of the FTA under which the EU is entitled to exclusive competence.97 
The EU and Japan reached a political agreement in principle on the main elements of the FTA in July 2017.98 
As of September 2017, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and 
Canada has been provisionally applied.99 Yet, Belgium’s 6 September request to the Court to determine 
the compatibility of the Investment Court System (ICS) of the CETA with EU law may impact the full 
implementation of the agreement.100 In September 2017, the European Commission announced that FTA 
negotiations with Australia and New Zealand will be commenced.101 Since ongoing TPP and RCEP 
negotiations will inevitably influence the EU’s trade relations with the Asia-Pacific, the paper provides the 
following policy recommendations.  
• While the European Parliament has conducted research on the TPP, it is pivotal to assess the 
economic impact of the RCEP on the EU. Ten RCEP countries are among the EU’s top 30 trade 
partners and eight RCEP countries are among the 20 countries with which the EU runs the largest 
trade deficits.102 It also benefits the EU’s trade strategy to explore how the seven TPP partners and 
four Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) members of the RCEP countries will transplant the TPP and 
TiSA standards into the RCEP.103 
• The EU’s ICS proposal reflects a reformed approach to investment protection and provides a 
framework for a multilateral investment court.104 Currently, the ICS is only included in the CETA and 
the EU-Vietnam FTA. None of Asian FTAs, such the TPP or the RCEP, have included or considered 
the ICS. The insistence on incorporating the ICS into bilateral FTAs will likely postpone negotiations. 
Furthermore, based on the Court’s decision on the EU-Singapore FTA, the inclusion of any ISDS 
provisions in the FTA would inevitably delay and increase the unpredictability of the FTA due to 
the need for member states’ ratification. 
The EU’s discussion “on the best architecture for EU trade agreements and investment protection 
agreements” is advised to address the legal nexus between the FTA and the investment 
agreement, as well as timeframes for concluding and implementing both instruments.105 A 
potential approach is to utilize the FTA as a framework for a subsequent bilateral investment 
agreement with ISDS provisions. Four ASEAN+1 FTAs and the China-Taiwan trade agreement have 
adopted such an incremental approach. The investment agreement thus forms an integral part of 
the FTA without delaying the liberalization of tariff eliminations and services trade. 
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• In 2009, ASEAN and the EU halted the negotiations of a region-to-region FTA and the EU began to 
focus on bilateral FTA negotiations with ASEAN states.106 In 2017, ASEAN and the EU agreed to 
“intensify work towards the resumption of the ASEAN-EU” FTA.107 Other than FTAs with Singapore 
and Vietnam, the EU is undertaking negotiations with Indonesia and the Philippines and will 
evaluate the resumption of negotiations with Malaysia and Thailand.108  
The potential ASEAN-EU FTA should take these bilateral FTAs into account. For instance, the rules 
of origin may help consolidate the regional supply chain and minimize the conventional “noodle 
bowl syndrome.” The development provision could streamline the EU’s involvement in the 
implementation of the Initiative for ASEAN Integration Work Plan III, which provides assistance to 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. 
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